On Donald Trump’s orders, in exchange for unilateral tariffs of ‘just 15%’, the EU suddenly revises its digital regulations to open its market even wider to American Big Tech. But it’s all in the name of competitiveness…
France 24 – 19 November 2025
Blog
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Has Trump Killed Globalization?
A Fierce Struggle for Tech Dominance—Outside Europe.
Le Débat du jour on Radio France Internationale, 5 November 2025
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Rare Earths: China’s Nuclear Option
Donald Trump said after a summit in South Korea with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping that he had agreed to reduce tariffs on Chinese products to 47% in exchange for Beijing guaranteeing a supply of rare earths and buying American soybeans
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French Debt: an Economic Impasse
I was on France 24 to discuss France’s political void and the toxic rhetoric about the IMF’s arrival—while the debt debate ignores the core issues: economic, technological, and educational challenges.
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Confronting Europe’s Vassalization: Resistance or Rhetoric
The level of subordination revealed by the agreement between Ursula von der Leyen and Donald Trump has sparked awareness of the European Union’s economic, technological, and political impasse vis-à-vis the United States. This latest transgression by the European Commission President spells an existential crisis for the EU.
The unilateral imposition of US tariffs on European production has caught the public’s attention. In reality, their relatively moderate overall level of 15% is the result of much more substantial concessions made by the European Commission. The EU is committing itself to further increasing its dependence on a range of issues. In order to save the precarious industrial status quo of ultra-exporting industries, particularly in Germany, it is compromising its technological future. Europe is relinquishing any ambition for autonomy in the digital, defense, and energy sectors, in line with the latest NATO summit. Amid the threat of trade chaos, Donald Trump is thus succeeding in imposing not only a new paradigm of unilateral tariffs, but also a much broader logic of economic—and geopolitical—domination over the most aligned countries.
Many EU politicians are expressing their embarrassment at the revelation to the general public of the stalemate in which the EU finds itself. Calls for countermeasures against the US digital sector overlook the stage and real extent of Europe’s capitulation. In exchange for tariffs that are half the threatened 30%, the Commission has effectively given Donald Trump assurances that it will abandon any meaningful policy of technological competition.
Given Germany’s trade surplus with the US, a genuine policy of rebalancing through tariffs or investment would have been legitimate. European leaders should have accepted the principle and technical means of such trade rebalancing, while refusing to compromise on the idea of widespread servitude that would bind future generations. A level-headed approach would have resulted in low tariffs without any additional concessions on technological, military, and energy autonomy. By focusing exclusively on the immediate interests of ultra-exporting industries and on the United States’ most excessive demands, the unrealistic prospect of 30% tariffs in the long term has led Ursula von der Leyen to undermine the EU’s technological potential.
The European Union’s current state of paralysis is deeper than this humiliating trade agreement would suggest. It concerns its governance, extreme bureaucratization, submission to interest groups, and the regurgitation of generic ideologies imported from American culture war by all political factions, from the far right to the far left to the center. The United States is gradually recovering from its industrial meltdown, despite its educational and cultural crisis, by mobilizing its historical strengths. This ability to bounce back relies in particular on the financial resources offered to creative and scientific minds. Conversely, Europe is falling into the habit of copying the most detrimental aspects of US governance and mass culture, without the qualities of a system that gives itself the scientific means to achieve strength.
Faced with industrial decline, the United States is beginning to reindustrialize, thanks in particular to low energy costs. Conversely, the Commission is exporting the chaos of German energy policy to countries that could still benefit from a rational energy infrastructure, and is now promising massive imports of American LNG at prohibitive prices.
While the weakness of the European position had been blatant for many months, representatives of US organizations in Brussels, such as the website Politico Europe, defended the Commission’s position with surprising tenacity, even praising its strength and unity. These sham negotiations have in effect served to seal Europe’s defeat in the face of US corporate interests. Looking beyond Donald Trump’s peculiar style and manner, US international policy tends to be largely bipartisan. The Biden administration’s Inflation Reduction Act was already a sweeping protectionist policy aimed at reindustrializing the US. The European governments’ lack of familiarity with European and global realities paved the way for the von der Leyen Commission’s vacuum, combining submission on the international stage with authoritarianism at home.
More than just a tool for trade rebalancing, Trump sees trade barriers as a form of sanction. It was in light of the escalation in recent months with China, which stood up to him, that he focused on the countries most closely aligned with the US, in a disastrous geopolitical context. This has been particularly apparent in relation to Gaza, where the EU has refused to exert any influence, taking US intimidation to the letter. The limits of economic measures have been demonstrated in the case of a country as large and resource-rich as Russia. Conversely, in the case of Israel, the EU had obvious and immediate levers to put an end to a policy of annihilation in its neighborhood, if it possessed any desire for autonomy and historical awareness. Much more than a simple question of strategy in international negotiations, Europe’s political meltdown points to a crisis of civilization.
This piece was originally published by the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS).
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Europe is selling out its future to Trump
“I was on France Info TV yesterday discussing how, behind the threat of chaos, Trump is successfully pushing a new paradigm of unilateral tariff protection. While these tariffs are relatively modest, they come with a long list of demands aimed at deepening his partners’ dependencies in digital, military, and energy sectors. Meanwhile, Europe is sacrificing its technological future to prop up its legacy industries.
Click the image to access the video (in French).
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Trump is Forcing his Terms on his Vassals
On France Info TV, discussing how Donald Trump is using tariff policy to assert economic and technological dominance over even his closest allies.
Watch key excerpts, in French.
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World Economic Fiasco: The Twilight of Davos
Atlantico: Does the end of Klaus Schwab’s era mark a definitive break for the World Economic Forum, or can the institution find new momentum without betraying its core identity?
Rémi Bourgeot: Schwab had a knack for sensing the challenges posed by the gaping flaws of a system of which he himself was one of the leading advocates. Yet this approach was undermined by its own social framework. Beyond the current scandal, the erosion of managerial and governmental structures—particularly in Western countries—has deepened a broader crisis of meaning. We are witnessing a shift toward ever more insular, event-driven elitism, replacing the very notions of elite and leadership, which have been weakened by declining educational and cultural standards.
With its economic failures—stemming from the fragmentation of production chains in the name of bureaucratic optimization that has devolved into industrial tragedy—and a service sector increasingly detached from the concept of productivity, the idea of global governance has collided with a more fundamental question: competence. Schwab sought to propose an aggiornamento of global governance, threatened with collapse not only by populist leaders but, above all, by its own internal contradictions. However, the concept has evolved in an intellectually vulnerable context, succumbing to the allure of cultural warfare and spectacle.
Davos is merely the most visible, most glamorous tip of the iceberg. The proliferation of unlikely think tanks, especially in the United States, claiming to offer direction to executives, is a symptom of a deeper crisis of meaning. In a Western world that has turned away from tangible achievements, the most deindustrialized countries are the most obvious victims. In Europe, major French corporations are particularly vulnerable to this conditioning, against a backdrop of globetrotting corporate retreats.
Does Christine Lagarde represent a genuine leadership option to steer the WEF’s transition, or does her name merely crystallize a broader strategic void within the institution?
Beyond speculative rumors about individuals, we see many institutions replacing analysis and innovation with communication-driven management, meticulously calibrated in principle. Without the tools needed for major strategic shifts, these situations easily spiral into failure. This logic permeates beyond executive boards. It is likely that the WEF will double down on its role as an exclusive club rather than offering substantive guidance.
As companies gradually disengage from DEI policies, can Davos still position itself as a showcase for global progress without alienating its historical base?
Paradoxically, Schwab’s “Great Reset” initially stemmed from the observation that globalized governance—centered on quarterly financial capitalism and the Americanization of the masses—was hurtling toward a dead end. The idea was to expose the system’s flaws and advocate for a more intelligent form of cooperation. This echoed the calls for reorientation that briefly surfaced a decade earlier, in 2008, before the collective surrender to the opiate of monetary bubbles. Public institutions and corporations alike struggle to address the quest for meaning and the challenges of change, as seen in the widespread distortion of ESG principles.
As the global balance shifts toward assertive multipolarity, can the Davos Forum still assert itself as a structuring force in international dynamics, or does it risk being sidelined by emerging centers of influence? How did one man, Klaus Schwab, manage to plunge the Davos Forum into an existential crisis—and what does this fragility reveal about the elite’s reliance on tutelary figures rather than genuinely democratic and resilient structures?
The transatlantic fracture of the Western bloc represents a fundamental rupture. The same applies to the shifting alliances among the BRICS nations, despite their deep differences, in the face of Western disorientation. These developments carry significant geopolitical consequences, but also profound implications for economic and social thought. European leaders, in particular, are grappling with a crisis whose psychological dimension should not be underestimated, given how deeply the American leadership has shaped their collective imagination—both geopolitically, with Europe’s conversion to neoconservatism in the 2000s following the Iraq War, and individually, through the standardization of lifestyles.
This interview was originally pulished in French by Atlantico
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Behind DeepSeek: France’s Path to AI Excellence
By leveraging its mathematical expertise and open-source innovation, Europe can compete with the United States and China—not just through massive investments, but above all by keeping scientific culture at the heart of its strategic vision.
As China’s DeepSeek reshuffles the global AI competition, France is also seeking to highlight its cutting-edge capabilities, announcing major investment projects in digital infrastructure at the Paris Global Summit. The rapid success of Mistral AI has demonstrated France’s potential, with its researchers and engineers defying the educational crisis through their mathematical talent. Yet a gap persists between this scientific excellence and public action, as seen in recent missteps—most notably the premature launch of the open-source AI model Lucie. The state must redeploy its scientific expertise to ensure strategic cohesion in these investments and prevent Europe’s digital ecosystem from being systematically overshadowed by Silicon Valley.
This moment is all the more critical as the notion that cutting-edge AI is an exclusively American domain fades, given the proven capabilities of countries like China—and France, with its strong mathematical tradition perfectly aligned with the challenges of neural networks. DeepSeek has shown the world that, with just a few million dollars and limited graphics cards, it’s possible to achieve results that rival those of American giants. Barely a year ago, Mistral also unveiled a model that competed with OpenAI’s, developed in a matter of months by a team of just a few dozen people. France’s AI expertise is undeniable. This talent is also evident within U.S. tech giants: Yann LeCun, Meta’s chief AI scientist, has inspired an entire generation. His company’s open-source model, LLaMA, was initially developed by a Paris-based team.
Many of us already recognized in 2023 the rise of a more efficient and refined AI than that of California’s giants. French minds often find opportunities in Big Tech to apply their mathematical brilliance. Several of Mistral’s founders, in fact, honed their skills in these companies. However, if every European success is ultimately absorbed by American giants—as Mistral nearly was—the benefits for Europe will remain minimal. Given the economic upheaval AI brings, such a trend would lock us into dangerous dependency. Transhumanist visionaries have no real plan for Europe beyond its picturesque landscapes.
The development of infrastructure and data centers, backed by massive investments, is essential for our autonomy. While France’s efforts in this direction are commendable—assuming they materialize fully—they must avoid hiding behind convoluted consortia reminiscent of Airbus-era strategies. Yet we cannot overlook the need for a deeper reflection on funding sources, decision-making balance with international partners, and the long-term viability of these projects.This also requires addressing the persistent technological deficit in public administration, despite the renewed focus on industrial policy. Scattered funding, insufficient analysis, and the excessive event-driven communication of “France 2030,” along with the overhyped “hydrogen revolution” and reindustrialization statistics skewed by self-employment, demand a more fundamental effort from the state. This is especially urgent as global political shifts threaten to disrupt the open-source ecosystem, which is central to Europe’s AI catch-up strategy.
Open source represents a remarkable opportunity for technological knowledge sharing. Yann LeCun is a vocal advocate, and he seems receptive to the idea of his home country reclaiming its rightful place in scientific tradition. However, given U.S. officials’ outcry against DeepSeek and calls for stricter restrictions, there is a risk that Big Tech’s dominance could tighten further, leaving only China as a credible counterbalance. Governments will now have to address the circulation of AI models and open-source frameworks as a key issue in trade negotiations.
Europe will not match the scale of American investments. Yet DeepSeek, Mistral, and others worldwide have proven that we can reposition ourselves in the digital landscape—by relying on open source for now, but above all by placing engineering culture, with all its versatility, back at the core of our strategic decisions. This path, neglected by Europe over the past three decades, is the one being followed by BRICS nations that are effectively positioning themselves in the tech race. We will not succeed by focusing solely on regulatory questions, but by restoring scientific culture to the heart of our choices.
This text was originally published on the website of Les Echos.
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Semiconductors Are the Achilles’ Heel of the AI Giants
The ultra-concentration in the design and production of semiconductors for AI, centred around Nvidia and TSMC, is fuelling the interest of digital giants, which are highly dependent in this regard. However, catching up looks to be a difficult task, despite the mobilisation of state actors.
The explosion of artificial intelligence rests on two pillars of a different nature: on the one hand, the development of large language models such as GPT, and on the other, spectacular computing power with dedicated processors. These are designed in particular by the omnipresent giant Nvidia, and manufactured by a tight handful of actors, especially the Taiwanese company TSMC. AI models and semiconductors both require gigantic investments and cutting-edge expertise. However, these are two worlds that, although they cooperate closely, respond to very different requirements.
In terms of model development, American digital giants such as Microsoft, Meta and Google have all the technological, economic and political resources to dominate the sector, both internally and through acquisitions/partnerships. This latter aspect even enables them to domesticate the diversification seen with the explosion of open source, i.e., models that are freely distributed and reusable by anyone. Although open source allows an entire AI ecosystem to exist, it cannot exactly be seen as David’s weapon against Goliath, as the giants themselves are deeply invested in it. Meta’s LLaMa language models are, for example, open source. Moreover, the financial weight and grip of Big Tech are such that we are seeing independent actors being drawn into their orbit one after the other. The French gem Mistral recently announced it was joining Microsoft’s fold, entrusting it with the distribution of its most advanced model, which will therefore be closed. The giants thus have ample means to maintain control over model development.
Nevertheless, behind the domination of these behemoths, the importance of the processors that enable the training of these AI models should not be underestimated. It is in fact the crux of today’s technological warfare and lies in the hands of industrial giants of a different kind. The entire AI scene remains highly dependent on a semiconductor design and production chain that is incredibly concentrated, revolving around Nvidia and TSMC.
A boom in demand for semiconductors dedicated to AI, and very few suppliers
For digital giants, autonomy in terms of semiconductors remains a challenge in which it is difficult to position oneself. After years of investment, Nvidia holds a near-monopoly position in the design of semiconductors dedicated to AI. The American company designed 80% of this type of semiconductor worldwide last year.
Once the design is completed, Nvidia outsources their manufacturing to Taiwan’s TSMC, one of only ten companies in the world capable of producing them. Nvidia is said to be “fabless”. In this industry, manufacturing a semiconductor requires a production line with specific characteristics (manufacturing equipment, testing and packaging). These new production lines are extremely costly. A brand-new factory (or foundry in the sector’s terminology) requires between 15 and 20 billion dollars and a minimum of two years of construction. Very few economic players can invest such colossal sums and overcome the entry barriers to the foundry market (“Fabs”).
States are seizing the issue in the name of technological sovereignty
Despite the enormity of the investments, some actors are entering or returning to this market, such as the American Intel or the Japanese Rapidus. Manufacturers already in the race, like TSMC or South Korea’s Samsung, are continuing to invest in an attempt to maintain their market shares. After the Covid-19 crisis and the subsequent semiconductor shortage, several states decided to relaunch their financial support for the sector. “Chip Acts” have multiplied to increase national semiconductor manufacturing capacity, bolster economic security and guarantee supplies for military use even in times of crisis. Among these countries are the United States in 2022 with the Chips and Science Act ($39 billion), the European Union with the Chip Act (€43 billion in 2023), Japan with the creation of the Rapidus conglomerate and a support plan ($100 billion for Rapidus and new TSMC factories over 2023–2027), China with the launch in 2023 of phase 3 of the Chinese government’s semiconductor fund ($46 billion for 2023–2027), and South Korea with a government plan of $7.3 billion. In the United States, the leverage effect of public subsidies in the sector is noteworthy. The $39 billion of the Chips and Science Act encouraged a wave of private investments amounting to $200 billion, spent by American and foreign companies on American soil.
New entrants and a new scale of financing
Until new factories produce more chips, supply will not be able to meet global demand for AI-dedicated chips. Hence a significant rise in prices. A Nvidia GPU (H100) can cost up to $40,000 per unit. Its availability is limited, because even with increased production volumes, the company still cannot meet market demand. Some users and buyers of Nvidia chips are concerned about being dependent on a single supplier. This is the case for Sam Altman, CEO of OpenAI, because the lack of AI chips risks hindering the development of his own company. Why not try to create one’s own industrial tool to restore this supply-demand imbalance? This is the logic of every new entrant in a booming sector. Sam Altman has been holding numerous meetings with manufacturers and investment funds over the past few months. In his initial estimates, he mentioned a (staggering) investment goal of $7 trillion to build a new segment of the semiconductor industry. The project is still ongoing. And Altman is not alone. Initiatives are springing up. Apple is working with TSMC to manufacture AI chips. The head of the Japanese group SoftBank, Masayoshi Son, wants to turn his group into an AI powerhouse. His latest project is to enable its subsidiary ARM to create a new AI chip division. A prototype will be tested in spring 2025, and mass production should begin in autumn 2025. For its part, Nvidia is maintaining its technological lead in a rapidly growing market. According to the Canadian research centre Precedence Research, the global market is expected to reach $100 billion by 2029 and $200 billion by 2032.
This new type of shortage is prompting digital giants to position themselves in the segment, each in their own way. Faced with these ambitions, Nvidia continues tirelessly to position itself to do even better, notably better than what the giants will probably be able to achieve in designing AI-dedicated processors. The digital giants find themselves caught in an industrial vice that will be difficult to overcome. The prospect of balanced global competition in which all major regions manage to position themselves remains distant and uncertain. Beyond their own interests, the ultra-concentration of AI-dedicated semiconductors highlights a very real risk to industrial resilience across the entire chain, down to end users. In this regard, diversification is a major political issue.
This piece was originally published by the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs – IRIS.