Interview on France 24 in French – Read the full English transcript below the video.
Rémi Bourgeot is with us live to discuss the US sanctions against Iran. Hello, and thank you for joining France 24. You are an associate researcher at IRIS. “It will work,” says Scott Bennett. “It worked in Venezuela after the blockade. It worked in Cuba, and it will work in Iran.” Is it really that simple? Can weakening Iran’s economy actually weaken the Iranian regime?
Iran’s economy is indeed severely weakened, but there is a massive gap between the US announcements and the claim of waging a total economic war. The main obstacle to this aspiration is China, Iran’s most important trading partner. China is both a major importer of Iranian oil and a supplier of essential components to Iran.
Yet China refuses to comply with these sanctions. Given the current state of Sino-US relations—and China’s previous pushback against US threats, even commercial ones—Washington cannot afford to take an offensive stance against China with so-called secondary sanctions.
So there is a real disconnect between the announcements, the intended effect, and reality: the measures remain limited. Nevertheless, taken together, they are already very significant and exert enormous pressure on Iran’s economy, particularly through the US-imposed blockade.
If I understand correctly, Rémi Bourgeot, these are just empty threats? They won’t actually be enforced?
There is a sense of desperation on the US side. Donald Trump knows the military war is lost. It’s a strategic disaster: the US has lost much of its effective presence in the Middle East.
The idea is to announce strong measures to reassure neoconservatives in the US that the offensive continues, while at the same time trying to disengage militarily.
In terms of actual sanctions, Iran’s trading partners refuse to enforce them. This was not the case a few years ago, when US sanctions threats—particularly against banks in these countries—created real panic, and the sanctions were effectively followed.
Today, in China, the government prohibits banks from reacting and thus from enforcing these sanctions.
Other key players include Turkey, which cannot afford to follow US orders as it has no interest in doing so. The United Arab Emirates, for their part, were more aggressive a few months ago, urging the US to “finish the job,” but they have also sought to find a modus vivendi with Tehran.
Overall, the US lacks the means to impose massive secondary sanctions on Iran’s trading partners. This means that China, Russia, or Turkey, if they do not comply with these sanctions, will not face US retaliation.
These countries are in very different positions relative to the US. China, for example, has been in a standoff with the US for two years now: it rejects some US sanctions and prohibits companies—especially banks—from complying with them. We saw this during the trade war, when China threatened to restrict rare earth exports in response to US tariff threats.
This standoff has now extended to geopolitical sanctions targeting other countries. China is building on this momentum and banning the enforcement of sanctions on its soil.
The measures remain limited to networks directly linked to Iranian trade. But the idea of blanket sanctions—targeting anyone with even the slightest financial connection to Iran—is unacceptable to China. Moreover, Beijing has the means to reject and retaliate if the US pushes in that direction.
Other countries take a different approach. Turkey, a NATO member, is close to the US but also pursues its own interests and has no intention of blindly following US orders. That is not its agenda.
As for Russia, already under sanctions, it maintains a special relationship with Iran, particularly in military terms.
One last question, Rémi Bourgeot: Who currently controls the Strait of Hormuz?
The Iranians effectively control it, but the US adds its own additional blockade. Traffic is currently very low, especially toward Asia, but the situation is not completely blocked.
Washington went all-in with this summer’s offensive, but it was another resounding failure. Even economically weakened, Iran retains military and industrial capabilities—particularly through its ballistic missile and drone programs—which prevent the US from resolving the conflict militarily.
Today, we see a shift in US rhetoric toward economic pressure. But after two years of trade war, the US’s actual leverage is very limited.
This is a way for Donald Trump to send signals to neoconservatives as he tries, step by step, to extricate himself from this desperate situation.
Thank you very much, Rémi Bourgeot, for joining us today.