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    • Author: Rémi Bourgeot

    • From Greenland to Ukraine, the Fracturing of the West

      From Greenland to Ukraine, the Fracturing of the West

      Click on the image to listen to the recording on LinkedIn, in French

      Full transcript of my interview with France Info public radio on 18 January 2026.

      France Info: Hello, Rémi Bourgeot, thank you for joining us on France Info. In just 24 hours, do you think we have crossed all the thresholds that lead to a trade war, an economic war with the United States?

      Yes, in fact, we’ve been in this situation for quite some time. You’ll recall that last year, headlines were dominated by Donald Trump’s threats—threats of escalating tariffs—which ultimately led to a so-called “agreement” that was really just a series of demands accepted by the European Commission, including blanket tariffs of 15%, and, on top of that, Europe’s acceptance of very strict constraints, particularly to avoid over-regulating or challenging Californian tech giants. So that’s where we’re coming from. Things had quieted down a bit in recent months.

      So, yes, the end of this agreement was extremely unfavorable to the European Union, not only because of the tariffs but also because of the constraints that came with it, and Europe simply accepted the American demands?

      Absolutely. This agreement was extremely unfavorable to the European Union, not just because of the tariffs but also because of the constraints that accompanied them. Europe simply accepted the American demands. There wasn’t really any negotiation on the part of Ursula von der Leyen, who was later criticized by several European countries. We thought that was the end of it, but in reality, we’re seeing a much broader deterioration in relations between Europe and the United States—a genuine explosion within the Western bloc.

      This is particularly tied to the issue of Ukraine. We can see that the trade measures are targeting countries within the so-called “coalition of the willing.” So this is a much broader escalation. It seems that Trump actually wants to blow up NATO. This is a very aggressive show of force, which today goes far beyond trade—now a secondary issue. We’re in a frankly absurd situation with this Greenland issue. If there were a genuine strategic interest—and perhaps there is for the United States—they could achieve the same benefits through cooperation with Denmark, a country that is extremely close to the United States. Here, we’re seeing broader patterns in Donald Trump’s approach. It’s a much deeper, more long-term deterioration.

      The fracturing of the Western block—isn’t that exactly what Donald Trump wants? How can we respond? By activating the anti-coercion mechanism, for one. Emmanuel Macron and his team have indicated that he will call for this instrument to be activated among his European partners. Concretely, Rémi Bourgeot, this is being called an economic “bazooka.” What would it actually look like if this mechanism were triggered?

      Well, first of all, we should have threatened and entered into this showdown with Donald Trump from the very beginning, during the negotiations this summer, to avoid being crushed. We needed to understand that this was just the beginning. Today, we’re facing a much broader and more serious aggravation, so we can’t just defend ourselves on the trade front. We have to respond. These measures are part of a fairly broad framework. People talk about a “bazooka,” but it was originally designed to be used against other countries, particularly China. It requires a very large majority in Europe to implement, so it’s not a done deal. But at the very least, we must consider a response. Trump’s counter-response will be escalation, with the threat of economically crushing the Europeans, because his logic is one of humiliation. He has no respect for European leaders, and there are deep disagreements on burning geopolitical issues like Ukraine.

      Rémi Bourgeot, you’re describing a catastrophic scenario. How can Europe resist such escalation?

      The catastrophic scenario is war, which is unthinkable between Europe and the United States. But what we’re going to see now is escalation. This current escalation, with threats of additional 10% tariffs on the countries involved, was triggered because Europe sent a few soldiers—almost symbolically—to Greenland. On the surface, it’s almost nothing, but Trump tolerates no opposition, even to demands as extraordinary and absurd as acquiring Greenland. The relationship is in a dynamic of fracture. We’re going to see all kinds of escalations. But Trump does tend to back down when faced with firm resistance. China, for example, threatened further escalation and deployed its own “bazooka”—restricting the export of rare earth minerals—which created massive industrial problems for the United States. India, threatened with secondary sanctions to limit its trade with Russia, also reacted strongly. So Trump is sensitive to pushback.

      We need to understand this context of deteriorating relations with Europeans over the central issue of Ukraine, which is at the heart of this escalation.

      Thank you very much, Rémi Bourgeot, for your analysis as an economist and associate researcher at IRIS. This trade war has existed in reality since Trump’s return, but it seems to be taking a more concrete form in the last 24 hours, with these new tariffs announced by the American president and Europe’s announcement that it intends to retaliate.

    • After the Bubble: AI Can Serve Industrial Power Instead of Draining It

      After the Bubble: AI Can Serve Industrial Power Instead of Draining It

      This op-ed has originally been published by Les Echos(fr).

      The generative AI bubble is built on circular funding between sector players, valuations disconnected from economic realities, and an extreme concentration of resources on large language models (LLMs). What should be alarming is not so much the scale of these investments as their stark contrast with the disintegration of Western industrial capacities. The war in Ukraine exposed this structural flaw, revealing the inability to produce sufficient quantities of essential military equipment—the result of decades of deindustrialization and skewed capital allocation. Beyond its strategic dimension, this paradox calls into question how we measure economic power.

      On the AI front itself, the success of more frugal players like Mistral or DeepSeek demonstrates that innovation does not depend solely on a relentless race to build ever-larger models. Billions continue to pour into colossal physical infrastructures—energy-hungry data centers, specialized chips, computing networks—without questioning the fundamental limits of LLMs. These massive investments stand in sharp contrast to the chronic underfunding of industry, and paradoxically, of automation.

      Beyond the fantasy of a dematerialized digital world, data centers are infrastructures that consume vast material resources: energy, rare metals, electronic components. Their proliferation highlights the current paradox: we are exponentially increasing computing power, while the productive sectors that could benefit from these technologies lack funding and orders. Many of these sectors launch AI projects merely to tick a box and make announcements to attract investors. In the military domain, autonomous drones, intelligent combat systems, and predictive maintenance represent concrete applications where AI will make a difference—but only if integrated into a solid industrial base, rather than betting everything on unreliable models.

      The production chains for ammunition, armored vehicles, and electronic components, weakened by years of underinvestment, struggle to meet demand. Factories have closed, skills have dwindled, and revival attempts are hampered by the absence of long-term strategic planning. The United States, despite its own contradictions, is trying to correct this imbalance by relocating some strategic production. Europe, however, remains on the sidelines, locked in extreme technological dependence that undermines its sovereignty.

      The core issue lies in this skewed allocation of resources. Capital and talent are concentrated on speculative technologies, while industrial applications of AI—advanced robotics, autonomous systems, production process optimization—remain underfunded. Above all, they lack commercial guarantees in the form of orders. This creates a vicious cycle: the more investments flow into LLMs and their infrastructure, the fewer resources remain to modernize the real productive apparatus.

      Yet AI could be a major lever for reindustrialization if approached differently. A more balanced strategy would involve redirecting some investments toward industrial automation, developing practical applications embedded in production processes, and fostering hybrid skills that combine digital expertise with industrial know-how, rather than chasing publicity stunts.

      Without this strategic shift, the gap will widen between an oversized digital sector and an industrial base unable to meet material challenges. The war in Ukraine served as a wake-up call. Power is not measured solely by the ability to develop sophisticated algorithms but also by the capacity to produce essential equipment. The challenge is not to reject AI but to reintegrate it into an industrial logic, where digital innovation finally serves material production rather than replacing it. Without this rebalancing, the West risks ending up with an economy where computing power soars, but factories continue to close.

    • Agricultural Crisis and EU-Mercosur Deal

      Agricultural Crisis and EU-Mercosur Deal

      A growing divide between those advocating for production, resilience and know-how, and a bureaucracy still mired in the limbo of the 1990s.

      The EU is rushing to finalize a trade deal with the Mercosur while simultaneously preparing protective measures against Chinese products that can no longer find a market in the United States.

    • EU Breakup Risk and Productive Resilience

      EU Breakup Risk and Productive Resilience

      This piece is published in partnership with the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS).

      The U.S. administration criticizes the European Union for failings that often have real basis. However, the EU’s economic subordination to the United States and the embrace of its cultural crisis play a key role in Europe’s falling behind. In light of this paradox, these attacks are all the more destabilizing since the Trump administration’s economic demands – acquiesced to by Ursula von der Leyen – simultaneously hinder any possibility of Europe re-entering the technology race. Beyond transatlantic invective, this historical impasse makes the prospect of the EU’s breakup tangible. We must anticipate its potential effects through productive and intellectual resilience.

      The trade terms dictated by Washington first illustrate the technological impasse amid the transatlantic chaos. In exchange for unilateral tariffs of only 15%, the von der Leyen Commission has implemented a policy of accommodation towards the U.S. tech sector on most issues, with the exception of those related to social media content. The fact that these concessions are subsequently presented as a competitiveness policy unfortunately does not mitigate their long-term effects.

      The abandonment of technological autonomy follows a series of ill-conceived strategic choices. More than the lack of discussion, these bets have revealed a gap in scientific and industrial competencies. Examples include: the excessive gamble on hydrogen, the generalized transition to electric vehicles without competitive impact studies, later forcing a retreat, the semiconductor failure (with the costly reliance on technology transfers from Intel, now losing momentum). One could add the export of Germany’s energy transition shock, amplified by the abandonment over the past decade of gas import diversification projects, in favor of Nord Stream I & II. Concrete skills have been supplanted by bureaucracy, high-level events, and regulatory prose.

      We have imitated the excesses of U.S. governance, but omitted the scale of its research system, funding for technological programs, and the emergence of Big Tech within this framework. The aspect that inspires Europeans is more centered on the type of managerial hypertrophy that led to the decline of a company like Boeing.

      The crisis in European industry illustrates the exhaustion of a logic of extreme logistical optimization, at the expense of innovation and new industries. This has allowed us to benefit from very low costs in Asia and Central Europe while capitalizing on the prestige of legacy brands. The energy crisis and China’s technological leap – long presented as a promised land for European exports – have derailed this model.

      The fact that the United States seeks to anchor its reindustrialisation effort in the subordination of its vassals adds to these difficulties. Shortages of military equipment on the Ukrainian front have not only revealed the extent of industrial attrition in the EU and the US, behind the enthusiasm generated by the AI bubble at the same time. They have also accelerated the fracture within the Western bloc, leading Europeans to start redeveloping their military capabilities. However, this period of political turmoil seems ill-suited to long-term strategic planning and to averting nuclear risk, which motivated previous generations. Moreover, remilitarisation is largely benefiting US defence companies as evidenced by high-profile orders of F-35s.

      In reality, the level of deindustrialisation calls into question our very interpretation of GDP, given the activities that are now at the heart of developed economies, sustained by bubbles until they burst. At a time when many countries are developing, training engineers in large numbers, and deploying them for industrial expansion, we must soberly assess the value of our deindustrialised economies in the era of PowerPoint and circular funding.

      The euro crisis did not lead to genuine reconsideration. On the contrary, it was followed by a policy of monetary bubbles and, around 2017, the belief in an imminent leap forward for federal structures. A reindustrialization dynamic was even announced, although a more cautious analysis could only indicate the opposite trend. It is in this context that France’s situation has continually deteriorated on the financial and industrial front. The maxim that each crisis is an opportunity to complete a stage in the EU’s edification has accompanied the fading prospect of a stable, creative, and prosperous society.

      A fresh start for the European Union is hindered by the very nature of its falling behind, rooted in deep cultural trends, of which the bureaucratic drift and the educational crisis are central elements. Instead of remedies, we see numerous parties and movements of all kinds positioning themselves in a cultural war, the terms and theatrics of which are directly imported from the U.S. The Commission’s current concessions would, in a best-case scenario, delay a productive recovery by several years.

      Beyond Donald Trump’s invective, the long-term persistence of the EU can no longer be the sole working hypothesis in the face of looming financial shocks, productive and educational decline, and the outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war. States and economic stakeholders must prepare for the possibility of a disruption in the European system within a decade.

      The focus, at this stage, should not be on making prophecies about the triggering factor, among various options: from the election of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) to the exit of certain Central European countries, potentially losing their status as net beneficiaries of the EU budget due to Ukraine’s integration – which might explain why Moscow does not oppose it.

      Rather, the task at hand is to undertake preparatory work to avoid a disorderly breakup. Such an event would have dire consequences for countries that, at that moment, would lack both a productive base and necessary resources. In a scenario combining breakup and lack of preparation, the trend illustrated by the EU-Mercosur agreement could, by that time, even lead to food supply difficulties. A resilience strategy must address these tangible risks.

      Anticipating the possible return of responsibilities to the national level, within a framework closer to an integrated customs union and a monetary coordination mechanism, could provide some impetus towards a productive strategy and an educational revival. As the level of mutual ignorance among Europeans has reached an alarming level, such an effort could even bring us together around more concrete objectives of good relations and stability.

    • Europe’s Trade Problem

      Europe’s Trade Problem

      I took part in Al Jazeera’s Inside Story discussion with Andy Mok and Ben Aris. Ailing European economies need to rebalance their trade relations with China and break out of their self-inflicted technological doom loop.

    • AI Bubble and Military Bottleneck: A Systemic Crisis

      AI Bubble and Military Bottleneck: A Systemic Crisis

      The financial bets on the revolutionary promises of generative AI have soared to dizzying heights. Circular funding among industry giants is proliferating, while structural limitations are emerging regarding the reliability and economic value of large language models (LLMs). From one bubble to another, this new frenzy points to the deeper disorganisation affecting Western economies in the deployment of capital and skills. In this respect, the simultaneous weakness in industrial capacity among Ukraine’s backers reflects a systemic crisis.

      An opinion piece by Rémi Bourgeot, economist and engineer, Associate Fellow at IRIS.

      While the world was waking up to the concrete potential of artificial intelligence with ChatGPT, the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in early 2023 triggered the onset of a financial crisis. Technology stocks were hit hard. Venture capital funds were blamed for their risky financial schemes, particularly in the cryptocurrency space, which was hit by a series of scandals.

      These reservations were soon swept aside by a new wave of financial euphoria, this time centred on AI, but following similar patterns. Nvidia emerged as the big winner, with its graphics cards tailored to the requirements of giant neural network calculations. It effectively locked up the market with its proprietary platform, Cuda. The very notion of valuation ratios was overshadowed by the prospect of a radical transformation of human activity.

      It comes as no surprise that the intrinsic limitations of LLMs were overlooked during the initial phase of euphoria. Beneath the sweeping reactions of both AI apologists and staunch detractors, a more nuanced perspective emerged from discreet commentators, combining a technical grasp of neural networks with a philological intuition about the strengths and the limits of the syntactic logic captured by LLMs.

      OpenAI began by developing open, non-profit models, and its status remained hybrid for years. The prevailing idea was that LLMs would reach a qualitative tipping point, thanks to an explosion in size and compute resources. The confusing notion of AGI (artificial general intelligence) then served as a horizon for the most extravagant funding schemes.

      However, by 2024, the technical achievements of companies like Mistral in France and DeepSeek in China, with incomparably more limited resources, began to cast doubt on the idea that model deployment required the trillions of dollars mentioned by Sam Altman at OpenAI.

      The companies developing core AI models do not currently exhibit a real business model, beyond using investor funds to cover their expenses, particularly for the purchase of chips. On top of the issue of financial stability, the allocation of such resources to a particular technology must also be questioned. AI Pioneer Yann Le Cun has repeatedly emphasised the limitations of LLMs and called for efforts to be made on other types of models, which have been ignored by the bulk of investors. Instead, the bubble took on a new dimension, with massive funding from semiconductor companies like Nvidia to their own customers, like OpenAI.

      This latest bubble raises questions not only about this very industry, but more generally about the way the economy is funded. It seems increasingly difficult for developed countries to sustain industrial momentum beyond waves of financial and institutional frenzy that suggest magical thinking, or sometimes even mass hysteria.

      Meanwhile, the Ukraine war highlights the limitations facing Western industry in producing equipment. Production capacities for ammunition, armoured vehicles and electronic components have proven chronically inadequate to meet sustained and prolonged demand. Many factories capable of manufacturing critical components have been closed in recent decades. Supply chains are limited, often dependent on rare or offshore suppliers.

      This situation reveals a systemic failure centred on insufficient production, which goes beyond the defence industry. It results from a lack of strategic planning, particularly in terms of financing, energy supply and skills deployment. Reviving production requires restoring complex industrial chains and long-term profitability models. Otherwise, even massive investments will have no effect.

      Industrial strength does not come from stock market bubbles fuelled by the ecstasy of a post-physical digital nirvana. It requires careful interaction between businesses, research institutions and government agencies, based on long-term strategies and human skills. Behind the cutting-edge intellectual resources poured into LLMs, the bubble lays bare the erosion of industrial development strategies, exacerbated by failing educational systems and the relegation of scientific skills.

      Nevertheless, in light of the manufacturing rout epitomised by Boeing, the US policy focused on redeploying manufacturing and controlling energy costs is showing tentative signs of improvement. This is the case even in semiconductors, with TSMC establishing operations. Although financial shocks hamper in-depth reindustrialisation, the country is ultimately managing to assert its dominance in the digital field.

      The European Union, meanwhile, finds itself in a more precarious situation due to its technological retreat and the energy chaos stemming from Germany’s phase-out of nuclear power. By positioning itself as a faithful user of US technologies, it is undermining its industrial potential. In the dot com bubble of the late 1990s, Europe typically lagged behind during the upswing, endured the full brunt of the market crash, and ultimately failed to catch up on the technical front. In this respect, Ursula von der Leyen’s determination to cement the EU’s role as a digital and military vassal of the US for decades to come foreshadows a decline in living standards and political dislocation.

    • Competitiveness or Submission? Europe’s Dilemma

      Competitiveness or Submission? Europe’s Dilemma

      On Donald Trump’s orders, in exchange for unilateral tariffs of ‘just 15%’, the EU suddenly revises its digital regulations to open its market even wider to American Big Tech. But it’s all in the name of competitiveness…

      France 24 – 19 November 2025

    • Has Trump Killed Globalization?

      Has Trump Killed Globalization?

      A Fierce Struggle for Tech Dominance—Outside Europe.

      Le Débat du jour on Radio France Internationale, 5 November 2025

    • Rare Earths: China’s Nuclear Option

      Rare Earths: China’s Nuclear Option

      Donald Trump said after a summit in South Korea with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping that he had agreed to reduce tariffs on Chinese products to 47% in exchange for Beijing guaranteeing a supply of rare earths and buying American soybeans

    • French Debt: an Economic Impasse

      French Debt: an Economic Impasse

      I was on France 24 to discuss France’s political void and the toxic rhetoric about the IMF’s arrival—while the debt debate ignores the core issues: economic, technological, and educational challenges.
      Click the image to watch the video.