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    • Auteur/autrice : Rémi Bourgeot

    • Industrial Disruptions and Geopolitical Shift

      Industrial Disruptions and Geopolitical Shift

      Click on the image to view the video on LinkedIn – Full transcript below the summary on this page

      On France 24, I discussed the deep industrial impact of the Iran war and the shift in political bargaining:
      – Economic forecasts tend to account poorly for shocks in the physical world, focusing on market price variations and assuming substitution. The main economic damage lies in material shortages and supply chain disruptions, from energy to fertilizers to helium for chips manufacturing…
      – Geopolitically, Trump’s grand bargain on uranium enrichment has stalled. With a peace deal a distant prospect, sanctions relief for Iran is off the table as well. More focused steps should now center on the strait: the level of Iranian control, the lifting of the US blockade, and some international coordination.

      Full transcript of the interview:

      Good morning, Rémi, and thank you very much for being with us. Can I start by asking you what the immediate effects of the Iran war have been economically, beyond the fuel crunch, which of course everyone is very familiar with?

      This situation in energy markets isn’t just a story about rising oil and gas prices—it’s really disrupting supply chains all over the world in critical aspects. It’s about energy imports for many countries, especially in Asia, and also in Europe, but to a lesser extent. But it’s affecting some industries very, very heavily through price surges and shortages.

      There was little awareness in the beginning that critical components like helium would disrupt supply chains in production, such as semiconductors and chips generally. So it’s really a global crisis sparked by these shortages and by the way production is being disrupted.

      It’s not just about economic statistics or making assumptions about how GDP might be affected over a three-month horizon. It’s a much deeper crisis, really affecting supply chains. And that goes beyond the scope of just short-term economic monitoring and forecasting. It’s a real industrial crisis with so many ramifications—also for food production, in terms of fertilizer imports for so many countries.

      The Gulf has become so critical, not just beyond energy. Energy is obviously key, but we see all these ramifications, and this is affecting countries and industries across the world in very different ways. For some countries and social groups, this is having really dramatic effects—it can create situations of famine. You can go to such extreme levels.

      You mentioned helium there. Qatar exports 40% of the world’s supply, and it’s used in the production of semiconductors and pretty much across tech in general and other sectors. What might the societal repercussions of shortages in this sense mean for the world?

      It was somehow reminiscent of what happened during the COVID pandemic. Supply chains were heavily disrupted, and then there was also a boom in demand with fiscal support. So this is really running very deep into supply chains. You see disruptions everywhere.

      Some countries have stocks, so the effect is not immediate. It’s just like in energy markets—some countries have had this policy, this strategy of storing a lot of oil. That’s the case with China, which is supposed to be very dependent on the Gulf but is less affected in the short term thanks to this storage policy. So it applies to many countries and industries. But over time, after a few weeks and especially after a few months, you start to see much more concrete effects with these shortages.

      It means it’s really affecting production. It’s not just the rise in prices. There’s really a gap in production at the moment. This directly translates into decreased production. It’s not just about price signals or higher costs—it’s really outside the scope of usual everyday economic reasoning. It’s a crisis affecting the material world, not just economic models.

      Now, how critical is this for a lasting peace to be reached in this war? We’ve got an extension, an indefinite extension of the ceasefire, but that does not mean the war is over. Is there a big difference between the war continuing for another three to four weeks or the war continuing beyond that? Or is there already sufficient damage that will be felt for months to come?

      Well, it’s a critical distinction indeed. The prospect of a lasting peace or a lasting peace agreement, in my view, is still very distant. There’s been so much confusion in the negotiations—or in the talks, I should say—between Iran and the US, with this focus on the American part on the nuclear issue, even attributing statements to the Iranians which were completely unthinkable in their view. So negotiations have really not taken a good path in that respect.

      In the end, you have this prolongation of the ceasefire, and it’s indefinite. That’s really what matters in terms of relieving the pressure somehow. I think the talks are going to focus on the Strait of Hormuz and finding some kind of compromise—acknowledging Iran’s control of the Strait with some toll booth model.

      China, for example, has been pressuring Iran to take a moderate approach on the issue of fees. But the key focus right now is finding some kind of limited compromise rather than achieving a peace deal. The US doesn’t even have the proper negotiators to achieve any such aim. There’s been so much confusion on the part of the US to impose this kind of counter-blockade of Iranian ports and ships. It’s trying to have leverage on this specific issue of the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to find some way with Iran.

      But the prospect of incorporating all the possible aspects of a deal, including nuclear energy and uranium enrichment, is really very ambitious and a very distant prospect.

      Now the UK and France are spearheading talks to open the Strait of Hormuz or to keep it open once the war comes to an end. We’ve often spoken of de-risking with regards to China from the perspective of Western countries, but is this an instance of European countries perhaps de-risking in the face of Washington’s current unpredictability?

      Well, I think when it comes to managing the Strait of Hormuz, it’s not so much a strategy towards the US. There will need to be some kind of international arrangement, even if Iran retains control over the Strait and charges fees. That’s why the Iranians were willing to make some arrangements with Oman to have this international dimension to the management of the Strait.

      Europe clearly can be part of it. There needs to be some agreement, some arrangement to reopen the Strait, to make traffic happen smoothly, to reassure insurers, and to return to some kind of business as usual. It won’t be like before—it will be a new situation, clearly—but it has to be a predictable one. That’s really the key issue here.

      That’s why the Europeans are all playing this part, trying to show this willingness to take part in an international system of cooperation guaranteeing passage—not free passage literally, but to create a kind of new normalcy for passage through the Strait. That’s really what’s essential. It’s not just Iran stopping its threats to ships and the US lifting their counter-blockade. You need to have a real kind of international arrangement for things to resume in some normal way.

    • The Art of the Non-Deal: Mishandling Negotiations Without Re-escalation

      The Art of the Non-Deal: Mishandling Negotiations Without Re-escalation

      Deescalation in the Iran war happened as the US administration sensed that continuation carried too much economic cost, as a result of the energy crisis. The argument holds more than ever, especially when it come to the threat of re-escalation. This process however did not lead to a phase of structured agreement but rather a halt to the conflict, with ambiguous rules. Markets have interpreted this situation as if it already meant long-term stabilization, assuming a level of general resolution that cannot be easily achieved.

      Donald Trump tried to leverage this situation as if it already contained the outline of a deal, and to accelerate the sequence accordingly. Although the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened with a limited, even implicit understanding, this aim has so far been defeated by the attempt to rush broad negotiations under extreme threats.

      His framing of Iran’s concessions on enriched uranium follows this approach, moving the public narrative ahead of the negotiation itself. He tried to transform deescalation into a political outcome that could be presented as victory to his audience, rather than as an exit from an unsustainable military stalemate. Political obfuscation surrounding a military outcome tends to disrupt any long-term stabilization.

      The nuclear issue does not compress easily, since it requires explicit steps. At the same time, Israel introduces a separate constraint, since its objectives and claims in the region contradict a prolonged deescalation. This too pushes the US side to rush negotiation, not because conditions are ready, but because the balance is unstable.

      Narrative over Negotiation

      Donald Trump has described Iran’s position on its nuclear program, particularly regarding enriched uranium, in terms that had not been agreed by Tehran. As in other negotiations, his tactics consist in attributing to the counterpart concessions that are expected rather than obtained, as if the process could be advanced by anticipating its conclusion publicly.

      This approach reflects an attempt to convert deescalation into a rapid political outcome that can be presented as a success. The objective is less the construction of a detailed and sequenced agreement — which would require time and technical alignment — than the establishment of a perception of movement on Iran’s core positions. The negotiation is thus partly shaped by political signaling of victory rather than convergence.

      This logic is closely linked to a form of brinkmanship, where pressure is assumed to generate linear responses. The underlying assumption is that Iran will adjust its stance whenever the United States modulates escalation or restraint. It leaves open the possibility of operations or coercive actions, particularly as a comprehensive nuclear agreement remains distant and structurally difficult to assemble. The risk is therefore not so much a return to full-scale war, but a cycle of episodic escalation within a still-contained and reversible configuration.

      An Off-ramp Constrained by Its Own Logic

      The underlying constraint remains a preference in Washington to avoid a renewed large-scale confrontation, given its economic and strategic costs. At the same time, the absence of tangible diplomatic results is difficult to acknowledge politically. This produces an intermediate position in which disengagement is pursued while being continuously framed as progress or even victory. This results in a configuration that neither leads to stability or restarting the war, but where fragility comes from the attempt to compress a process that remains inherently slow.

      Israel’s role adds a second structural layer of instability. Its regional objectives, including territorial gains and expanded military control clash with the prospect of a prolonged deescalation phase. The divergence is structural and long-term, as US popular support of Israel quickly erodes. In practice, this has required the US administration to rely on explicit pressure to restrain Israeli moves long enough to preserve a narrow window for accelerated negotiations with Iran. The difficulty is that this sequencing is already under strain.

      Hormuz and the Structure of the Stalemate

      The Strait of Hormuz remains the central variable. A durable normalization would require coordination on passage rules, some form of fees or regulatory mechanism, and a broader ceasefire framework extending beyond the Strait itself, including Lebanon. None of these elements are in place as a result of the excessive focus on a global deal including the nuclear issue.

      The recent sequence highlights a persistent misalignment. The United States has maintained pressure while expecting functional normalization, while Iran has treated the Strait as a lever of negotiation rather. In practice, any sustained reopening requires coordination, even in the absence of a comprehensive agreement.

      External actors further complicate the picture. China, in particular, has been critical of a regime of fees that would alter flow conditions, while offering substantial material support probably more valuable than the toll booth model. This increases pressure on Iran to accept arrangements that preserve access. The equilibrium therefore depends on a balance of constraints and opportunities rather than only on a formal diplomatic settlement.

      At this stage, two broad configurations remain plausible. The first is the emergence of a partial framework, limited in scope but sufficient to organize coordination around the strait and establish minimal normalization conditions. This would allow Iran some economic space while leaving the nuclear issue only partially resolved. The second is a more explicitly frozen conflict, where no agreement is reached but where a managed status quo emerges, including conditional reopening of the Strait and continued tactical coordination between actors.

      For markets, many pricing assumptions remain built on simplified scenario frameworks that understate the institutional fragility of the situation, particularly around energy flows. The current situation should be understood as a reorganization rather than a resolution. Deescalation provides a temporary equilibrium, but it is increasingly exposed to attempts to convert it into a rapid political success without the institutional basis required to sustain it. Though the rationale for deescalation is more present than ever, the gap between political acceleration and structural constraint defines the fragility of the current situation.

    • Energy Markets Will Remain Shaped by Iran’s New Status Quo

      Energy Markets Will Remain Shaped by Iran’s New Status Quo

      Op-ed in Les Echos, 11 April, 2026.

      Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz is upending global energy markets. Prices remain under pressure, and geopolitical uncertainties are hindering a return to normalcy. Investors and governments must adapt to this new equilibrium, characterized by structurally higher costs and persistent tensions, according to economist Rémi Bourgeot.

      Iran’s dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the emergence of a new transit regime, is poised to have a lasting structural impact on global supply chains and price formation. This new reality is expected to have enduring effects on both markets and the real economy. There is little prospect of energy markets fully reverting to their pre-conflict state, even in the event of de-escalation.

      The conflict has been marked by Donald Trump’s erratic shifts between negotiation overtures and escalation threats, with no viable strategy in sight, underscoring the pressing need for de-escalation. The current ceasefire is diplomatically unstable, with parties failing to agree even on essential aspects such as the halt of Israeli strikes on Lebanon or on the version of Iran’s proposed list of negotiating points. While the prospect of a genuine peace agreement remains distant, the U.S. withdrawal from the Iranian front is rooted in the necessity of extricating itself from a particularly damaging stalemate. It thus seems unlikely that the United States will seek to fully reopen this front.

      Nevertheless, a U.S. disengagement without a concrete agreement paves the way for a new, ambiguous situation. The status of the Strait of Hormuz risks remaining undefined, based on the de facto control Iran exercises. It is therefore crucial to anticipate the dynamics that may prevail in energy markets amid this shifting landscape. Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, coupled with the emergence of a new transit regime, is poised to exert a structural impact on global supply and price formation. This new reality is likely to have lasting effects on both markets and the real economy. There is little prospect of energy markets fully returning to their pre-war state, even in a de-escalation scenario.

      The rest of this piece is available on Les Échos website in French. For similar insights, see my April 1, 2026 article, which already analyzed the implications of a looming de-escalation—with Iran’s de facto control over the management of the Strait of Hormuz: Partial Normalization in Energy Markets After Iran War Deescalation.

    • Iran to Control Reopening of Strait of Hormuz

      Iran to Control Reopening of Strait of Hormuz

      I was interviewed by France 24 about the energy crisis and the challenges of reopening the Strait of Hormuz amid the military stalemate. English transcript below the video.

      Rémi Bourgeot, you’ve been following this crisis very closely. Is this only the beginning?

      It obviously depends on how the military situation evolves. Donald Trump has been sending mixed signals, and markets have been swinging wildly in response.

      What we are seeing, in any case, is a military quagmire. Some geopolitical experts believe this is only the beginning. There are also signs of panic on the part of the U.S. administration, particularly from Donald Trump, who actually dislikes war. In fact, he prefers theatrical operations, like the one in Venezuela a few weeks ago. This, however, is a genuine quagmire.

      So he is sending signals suggesting he would like to stop, while striking as hard as possible. The Iranians, for their part, largely dominate the situation, but they are also sending signals through these exchanges, notably with Oman, to at least establish some kind of framework that could apply to a partial reopening.

      But what we are heading toward is Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. It could be reopened in part, even quite broadly, but likely under Iranian control, given that the United States is not capable of reaching its objectives—assuming there ever were tangible ones.

      This Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, over time, implies a different system, a different economic regime, notably involving tolls, of which we have already seen certain outlines, partially implemented. That does not mean this will be the final configuration, but costs will be raised and this transit system will be put in place in a way that serves Iran’s geopolitical interests.

      There have also been behind-the-scenes signals of exchanges between Iran and certain Gulf states—especially Qatar—to avoid strikes. But the situation is extremely tense, particularly with the United Arab Emirates, which has called on the United States to “finish the job,” to escalate, implicitly suggesting the deployment of ground troops. One could imagine Iran penalizing the United Arab Emirates more than other Gulf states.

      And in any case, this reopening cannot be achieved by force, only through negotiations?

      There is no real negotiation. There may have been emails or very indirect contacts, but there are very serious doubts about the reality of Donald Trump’s statements when it comes to negotiations.

      That said, the notion of de-escalation cannot be ruled out. This is not what we are seeing these days, but Trump is extremely uncomfortable with the situation and understands that he needs to withdraw. His political position is collapsing. There are very serious doubts about his personal condition and about the political system surrounding him. He is dismissing generals around him in order to hear what he wants to hear, to avoid bad news.

      What we are seeing is a genuine regime crisis developing in the United States, with much deeper roots. There is also an industrial side to this crisis, as the manufacturing base is unable to sustain what would be a long war.

      On the question of ground troops, this is perhaps the most revealing signal: there has been no such announcement. There has been no announcement either of an end to the war or of a withdrawal. Yet sending ground troops would mark the entry into a long war, with even more severe uncertainties—something that would be almost suicidal on Donald Trump’s part.

      Today, we are in an in-between situation, with a desire to get out of this quagmire, but Trump wants to be able to claim some form of victory and avoid humiliation. That humiliation is there in any case.

      To return to the very concrete consequences of this political and military deadlock, there has been much discussion in recent weeks about measures taken by countries to ration fuel, cut taxes, and provide subsidies. France, for the time being, is refusing to do any of this. Is that relevant?

      When it comes to acting on prices, taxes are often short-term measures. They can have positive effects. But the real situation we are facing is a form of shortage that is now emerging. This is about very concrete, material realities: ships that were supposed to arrive are not arriving. A shortage is taking hold, already very severe in Asia.

      It is worth recalling that Europe is much less dependent on the Gulf for its energy supply than many Asian countries. The various sources of supply—Norway, North Africa, the United States for LNG, and partly the Gulf—show that this dependence exists but remains limited. Some countries have larger reserves; this is the case for China, which also has greater autonomy, while still being largely dependent on the Gulf.

      The reality is therefore material: a shortage is taking shape. It is less pronounced in Europe, but it is already being felt. This is happening in the context of an economic crisis, particularly an industrial one, that was already acute before the start of this war. The issue of energy prices was already critical, with the effects of the war in Ukraine: loss of supply, attempts to reorient away from Russia, but at the cost of creating new dependencies—on the United States or on certain Gulf countries.

      We are thus seeing a form of hyper-globalization of energy networks that is now proving extremely vulnerable.

      On top of the crisis you’re describing, there is also inflation—the general rise in prices, including food prices to come. Should people in France prepare for this?

      Yes, it has a strong inflationary effect. We are not in the same situation as with the war in Ukraine, which came after the pandemic and very expansionary fiscal policies. We are not seeing the same kind of surge, but inflation is clearly rising.

      Above all, inflation is a composite index: behind it lies everyday life, constrained spending that affects certain activities and certain social groups more than others. That is what is particularly problematic, both socially and in terms of political instability.

      For more on the energy crisis and the Strait of Hormuz, read Partial Normalization in Energy Markets After Iran War Deescalation.

      This transcript has been slightly edited for clarity.

    • Partial Normalization in Energy Markets After Iran War Deescalation

      Partial Normalization in Energy Markets After Iran War Deescalation

      Energy markets are unlikely to fully return to prewar standards once a deescalation process starts. The conflict has introduced lasting costs. In particular, Iran’s role in the Strait of Hormuz has become structural to global supply risk and pricing, as a new transit regime can be expected to apply. This new normal should have a lasting effect on financial markets and the real economy.

      This piece is published in partnership with the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS).

      Donald Trump’s statements about the terms of negotiations with Iran have astonished many as they did not seem grounded in real diplomatic channels. Meanwhile, his threats of massive escalation and ground offensives hardly pointed to a realistic strategy, given the enormous political and economic cost, as even the European governments most aligned with the U.S. started to distance themselves. Although confusing, this agitation finally reveals the urgency to find an exit from the quagmire. In practice, deescalation can occur even without full negotiations. It is important to understand what dynamics will be at play in energy markets in light of this trend.

      Tehran has been exerting control over shipping through Hormuz during the conflict, by dramatically restricting or threatening access but also applying charges on commercial ships for transit. Sustained control over the strait would translate into direct economic influence and pricing effects on global energy markets. This can take the form of negotiated transit fees, enhanced monitoring requirements, and arrangements that reflect Tehran’s geopolitical interests.

      Such explicit or implicit arrangements would sustain a structural premium on energy prices. Transit fees could act like reparations, providing revenue to rebuild infrastructure and support the regime, while structurally sustaining a premium on global energy prices. Simultaneously, some sanctions have been effectively relaxed in the sense that Iranian crude continues to flow through the Strait of Hormuz, reflecting U.S. reluctance to further tighten supply and worsen global price shocks.

      Market Price Dynamics and Short‑Term Reactions

      A cessation of hostilities would reduce active risk to tankers allowed passage by Tehran and reassure insurers, lowering the current premium embedded in energy prices. It would quickly see at least a partial reversal of the price spikes, which translated into an overall 60 percent surge. Global equity indices rose and energy futures already fell on various reports of deescalation prospects.

      However, a deescalation process alone does not guarantee an immediate restoration of normal flows or of confidence in the security of transit routes. Reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, clarification of maritime security arrangements, and the re‑establishment of reliable insurance coverage are all prerequisites to a fully functioning transport environment. These processes take time and some degree of international coordination. Risk premia and cost structures in energy markets can therefore be expected to persist above prewar levels.

      The overall disruption to oil markets is unprecedented and price behavior cannot be read solely through short‑term trading patterns, in one way or another. Oil and gas futures curves frequently reflect this complexity. For example, short‑term contracts have exhibited backwardation — where near‑term prices are higher than further delivery dates, indicating that markets expect supply constraints to ease over time even if the near‑term remains tight. However, persistent risk premiums and structural changes in supply can maintain a higher baseline.

      A Lasting Economic Impact

      Meanwhile, prolonged increases in energy prices feed through into inflation. Energy‑related price pressure will persist beyond short‑run market repricing. Persistent inflationary pressure complicates macroeconomic trends, reinforcing second‑round effects such as wage demands and broader price adjustments beyond energy components. In turn, higher inflation expectations and elevated energy costs feed directly into bond yields on government debt, affecting sustainability.

      For energy importers, the implications extend beyond immediate price levels. Disruptions affect contract structures, investment decisions in alternative supply lines and household cost burdens. Europe, while less directly reliant on Gulf than Asia for crude oil and LNG, faces its own challenges in terms of supply and pricing dynamics. With the relegation of nuclear energy production Europe’s strategy has tended to become a process of shifting from one external dependency to another as crises erupt.

      Deescalation reduces acute risk, but structural factors such as Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz and the time needed to rebuild confidence and infrastructure mean the market may settle at a new normal contrasting with prewar levels. The interplay between security, infrastructure, inflation dynamics and fiscal stress will shape financial and macroeconomic conditions in ways that a simple cessation of hostilities does not entirely resolve.

      This piece only serves analytical purposes and does not constitute investment advice.

    • Iran Quagmire: Tackling the Long-Term Costs

      Iran Quagmire: Tackling the Long-Term Costs

      Click on the image to access the video

      Donald Trump is looking for an off-ramp from the Iran war quagmire. While threatening major escalation that would make parts of the region uninhabitable, he claims that negotiations are taking place.Although real peace negotiations are now out of reach, given the unbridgeable gap in demands, a deescalation is possible.

      Countries dependent on energy imports from the Gulf however brace for long term consequences even if the conflict halts. Production capacity is now damaged and Iran is likely to retain a high level of control over the strait.

      Europe is less exposed to the supply crisis than Asia but the energy price surge severely aggravates its multiple crises, from manufacturing to debt management. The relegation of nuclear energy leaves the continent particularly exposed to this succession of geopolitical crises, with governments constantly shifting from one external dependency to the next as shocks erupt.

      I took part in Al Jazeera’s Counting the Cost. Extracts of my interventions are available here.

    • Beyond the Iran Fiasco, an Abysmal Strategic Vacuum

      Beyond the Iran Fiasco, an Abysmal Strategic Vacuum

      Op-ed published by Les Echos on 24 March 2026. As Donald Trump seeks a way out of the Iranian quagmire—to suspend hostilities without any real prospect of peace—I invite you to consider a broader reflection on the strategic void that accompanies this situation:

      The war with Iran reveals a structural failure within the American decision-making apparatus, marked by a difficulty in aligning immediate tactical actions with long-term political objectives. This misalignment extends beyond the military sphere. Defense, trade, finance, and technology policies interact in a chaotic manner. The conduct of the trade war has already illustrated this: the legitimate goal of reindustrialization has been overshadowed by geopolitical coercion.

      In this very real war, the inability to anticipate the consequences of a failed regime change or the closure of the Strait of Hormuz further demonstrates a loss of overall vision. The military instrument is wielded without a political framework capable of setting a clear direction.

      These strategic and material flaws, already evident in the war of attrition in Ukraine, suggest a system grappling with internal contradictions and a reliance on a form of virtual thinking. The strategic framework appears frozen in patterns inherited from the era of the Iraqi adventure, even as industrial and geopolitical realities have radically transformed, reshaping the balance of power. This latest crisis calls on Europe to undertake a difficult reorientation.

      Retreat of Monetary Hegemony

      Economic sanctions have become a central tool of diplomacy. Yet their use generates side effects that are beginning to reshape the global financial architecture. Initially designed to isolate specific actors without direct military engagement, these measures have accelerated the search for alternatives. Beyond the surge in gold, we are witnessing a proliferation of bilateral agreements in local currencies and the development of parallel clearing systems, which are undermining one of the pillars of American power.

      The Iranian conflict acts as a catalyst here. The paralysis of the Strait of Hormuz underscores how power depends not only on dematerialized flows but even more on complex material systems: energy and industrial infrastructures. The West finds itself in a position where its instruments of pressure are losing effectiveness as regional powers adapt, coordinate outside traditional frameworks, and are prepared to escalate.

      Industrial Wars of Attrition

      Above all, the evolution of recent operational theaters, particularly in Ukraine, has forced a belated rediscovery of the importance of the industrial base. Technological superiority and the development of financial markets may have created the illusion that mass production capacity was secondary. The reality of a war of attrition has shown that economies with much more modest GDPs, but equipped with resilient production systems supported by China, can stand up to technological powers whose production chains are fragmented or optimized for peacetime.

      This situation reveals a divide between nominal wealth, driven by services and intangible assets, and the actual ability to mobilize material resources in prolonged crises. Tensions over ammunition stocks and delays in reactivating defense industries illustrate this lack of industrial depth. Although deindustrialization is recognized as a risk to social cohesion and strategic autonomy, the response has remained superficial. Tariff policies are often employed erratically, serving more as diplomatic tools than as genuine levers for rebuilding an integrated productive fabric.

      Misalignment of Capital and Educational Erosion

      Meanwhile, financial markets continue to channel capital toward high-visibility sectors, to the detriment of fundamental infrastructure. The AI bubble absorbs a disproportionate share of investments, while heavy industry and industrial transformation struggle to attract the necessary funding. This imbalance creates a two-speed economy, where digital innovation advances without an industrial infrastructure capable of withstanding geopolitical shocks.

      This crisis of strategic thinking is rooted in the weakening of educational structures, particularly in scientific culture and the classical humanities. The decline in science education reduces the ability to grasp the physical and technical constraints of the real world, fostering a virtual vision where it is believed that large language models can replace versatile engineers. At the same time, the retreat of the humanities deprives decision-makers of the historical intuition needed to understand the long term.

      Europe particularly embodies this tension. The continent’s industrial catch-up is hampered by regulatory complexity, compounded by a shift in decision-making power from the technical to the administrative, reducing the capacity for long-term planning. The management of contemporary crises highlights the need for a transition toward a systemic approach, integrating energy security, industrial resilience, monetary stability, and technological innovation within a strategic framework. This transformation cannot occur without questioning decision-making and educational mechanisms. The reallocation of resources must be accompanied by a renewed emphasis on fundamental knowledge, capable of restoring a long-term vision.

      This piece was originally published on Les Echos website in French.

    • Why Gold Loses Its Appeal Amid the Iran War

      Why Gold Loses Its Appeal Amid the Iran War

      I answered questions from journalist Nils Adler on gold’s steadiness despite the Iran quagmire. In addition to quotes on Al Jazeera’s website, here is my broader analysis.

      A geo-economic shock such as the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz would traditionally be seen as driving gold demand higher. However, structural factors have tempered its safe-haven appeal.

      Flight to Liquidity, Volatility, and Market Psychology

      During major crises, financial markets often experience broad stress, with assets across the board under pressure as investors seek liquidity and safety, particularly in the U.S. dollar and Treasuries. Even gold, historically a safe haven, can remain flat or decline when markets favor cash or liquid assets. This pattern has been evident as the Iran war escalated. Gold has stayed relatively stable rather than rallying sharply, despite extreme tensions. Paradoxically, it is the potentially systemic nature of this crisis that limits demand for gold, as other financial mechanisms play out.

      In addition, the Federal Reserve’s stance remains decisive. Rising energy costs and persistent inflation reinforce expectations that interest rates may stay elevated, strengthening the dollar and making interest-bearing assets more attractive than non-yielding gold. This interaction suppresses bullion’s immediate appeal, showing how monetary policy interacts with geopolitical and structural financial risks.

      Also, the gold market is increasingly shaped by speculative trading and heightened volatility, which can spook risk-averse investors. Rapid swings and profit-taking discourage accumulation, undermining gold’s role as a safe-haven asset. Pre-existing multi-year highs amplify this effect, preventing a full-scale flight into bullion. Speculative volatility can defeat gold’s short-term function.

      Meanwhile, apart from bouts of systemic financial risks which can trigger flights to dollar liquidity, the geo-economic landscape will remain shaped by massive fragmentation, which support diversification efforts, including into gold over the longer term.

      Protracted Stalemate, Escalation Risk, and Energy Shocks

      The U.S. is faced with a strategic fiasco, as Donald Trump did not anticipate Iran’s response on gulf states and the strait of Hormuz. While he threatens to keep going up the escalation ladder, even his closest allies refuse to participate in high-risk, potentially suicidal, missions to escort tankers in the strait. The economic and political consequences pressure him to look for an escape strategy,

      However, even in case of deescalation, cessation of hostilities and reopening of the strait, a long-term negotiated peace between US/Israel and Iran is now out of reach for the foreseeable future. The central scenario is a protracted stalemate, which prolongs regional instability and durably threatens the Gulf’s export reliability. The conflict cannot be seen as a mere short-term and limited event. It will have significant consequences on the global economy and the block logic.

      Sanctions and Financial Fragmentation

      The expanding scope of sanctions and the increasing use of trade policy as a tool of geopolitical coercion have contributed to a fragmentation of the global financial system, encouraging state institutions, banks, and multinational corporations to explore alternatives to dollar‑based mechanisms. Where once the dollar served as a relatively uncontested anchor for international trade and reserve holdings, the growing risk of exclusion from dollar clearing and finance has led policymakers in several regions to reassess their reliance on U.S.‑centric systems. The war in Ukraine illustrated how quickly the reliance on traditional financial instruments can shift. The outbreak of hostilities and the flow of sanctions coincided with a sharp rise in the price of gold, as investors and central banks sought perceived safe havens.

      More recently, escalating trade tensions and competitive tariff strategies have prompted renewed diversification, whether through other currencies, gold and other commodities, or the development of regional payment systems. These dynamics suggest a broader reassessment of long‑standing assumptions about dollar dominance and raise questions about how economic policies will evolve in an era of intensifying geopolitical rivalry.

      The Essence of Gold

      Gold’s trajectory depends on the consequences of the Iran conflict, central bank responses, and the structural fragility of global finance. The muted price response to the Iran war confirms that gold does not always skyrocket during crises. Its enduring value lies in being a real, physical store of wealth, reflecting interactions among liquidity, sanctions, dollar dominance, interest rates, speculative volatility, and strategic uncertainty, rather than acting solely as a short-term panic hedge. Even under strong sanctions and geopolitical risk, gold’s primary role is preservation of wealth, not reactive price spikes.

      This piece is published for analytical purposes and does not constitute investment advice.

    • The West’s Gorbachev

      The West’s Gorbachev

      This piece is published in partnership with the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS).

      The Iran war points to a strategic vacuum extending well beyond military affairs. It reflects a broader failure to align actions with long-term objectives—a pattern also visible across trade, finance, and technology policy, from erratic tariff decisions to the AI bubble.

      Donald Trump had the intuition that social dislocation demanded reindustrialization, in the wake of the global financial crisis. However, his chaotic inconsistencies reveal a broader cultural and institutional malaise, evident since the Bush years, and mirrored across Europe. This systemic paralysis runs deeper than any single leader and obstructs substantial reorientation.

      Amid the educational crisis, the capacity for strategic planning informed by science and humanities has receded, giving way to geopolitical agitation, economics driven by inflated assets, and generalized improvisation.

      Tactical Successes, Strategic Vacuum

      The Iraq war was supposed to serve as a textbook example that the pursuit of regime change without a viable alternative can plunge a whole region into chaos. Yet, the same logic persists, without a coherent plan either to mitigate the immediate consequences of the war or to manage its aftermath. Excluding a ground offensive was supposed to put aside the specter of the Iraq fiasco in the eyes of the American public. However the current narrative rather points to the lasting legacy of the Bush era, despite Trump’s inconsistent efforts to strike a balance between neoconservative circles and the public’s rejection of long wars.

      This instability erodes rational calculation across the international system, as negotiations led by real-estate moguls prove episodic and unreliable. Meanwhile, the weaponization of finance accelerates defensive reactions among emerging powers. Alternative payment arrangements and bilateral trade mechanisms are expanding. What was designed as leverage undermines the monetary architecture that long sustained US trade deficits.

      The Lost Intuition About Manufacturing and the Social Fabric

      War also exposes material limits. The experience of Ukraine has demonstrated that Western industrial capacity struggles to sustain prolonged conflicts and especially a war of attrition, as production lags behind operational requirements. Europe, in particular, remains strategically dependent, lacking cohesion and sufficient manufacturing depth.

      Donald Trump centered his discourse on the impasse facing his country and the need for systemic change. His intuition was that social fragmentation stems from deindustrialisation. The difficulty lies in execution. Tariffs, without serious industrial analysis, aggravate the very instability they seek to cure, especially when they turn into sanction weapons wielded erratically.

      Trade wars were launched in the name of reshoring, yet without a coherent long-term framework linking workforce development and manufacturing technology. Constant shifts leave firms unable to plan capital-intensive investments. When the rules change continuously, for geopolitical reasons or as a result of legal rulings like that of the Supreme Court, reindustrialization efforts become rhetorical.

      The AI Bubble and Financial Distortion

      Simultaneously, vast liquidity flows into artificial intelligence without weighing the limits of existing architectures and relegating promising research. The scale of the speculative enthusiasm surrounding AI reflects a financial structure shaped by the printing press. Asset inflation has distorted price signals, encouraging capital to chase scalable digital opportunities while physical production systems often remain undercapitalized.

      Circular funding models and passive investment flows sustain high valuations often disconnected from business models. While artillery shortages reveal supply-chain fragility, capital concentrates in data centers, based on today’s state of technology, rather than reflecting on future advances in efficiency. The imbalance resides in the absence of coordination between financial allocation and strategic necessity. Over the long term, investment and credit waves sustain unproductive firms and delay adjustment. Resources are misallocated while machine tooling and applied engineering struggle to attract patient capital.

      Europe in Strategic Limbo

      The problem is particularly acute in Europe, where overregulation constrains entrepreneurial planning. Military rearmament is discussed with insufficient supply-chain strategies. Fiscal pressures narrow policy space. The continent risks combining strategic posturing with declining productive autonomy. More troubling is the human capital dimension. With the technological retreat, engineers and scientists have been relegated by social hierarchies dominated by bureaucracies and managerial symbols. The attempt to substitute skilled labor with AI-driven systems often reflects short-term cost minimization rather than industrial realism.

      Geopolitically, a push for autonomy had started to gain some momentum since Ursula von der Leyen’s full alignment last summer in trade negotiations—and, above all, since Donald Trump’s fanciful claims on Greenland, barely concealing his desire to blow up NATO. Yet beneath the rhetoric of strategic and technological independence, much of Europe appears to be waiting for signals of renewed transatlantic oversight, contingent on electoral shifts and military adventures. This, too, reflects a systemic transformation spanning two generations, shaped by bureaucratization and questionable organizations providing conferences. Industrial leadership and the opposition to the Iraq War now seem a distant echo.

      The Iran war serves as a stress test of a broader Western model. Military action, trade wars, and technological speculation unfold without anticipation. Despite the demonization of tarif policies, Trump’s assessment that social stability depends on industrial strength was correct. The failure lies in transforming that intuition into disciplined, long-term strategy at the state level. Like Gorbachev, his intuitions for reform have stalled in the face of deep-seated interests, institutional paralysis, and erratic execution. Without a renewed spirit of humanism in foreign policy, industry, finance and education, activism will fail to mask a profound cultural crisis.

    • From Greenland to Ukraine, the Fracturing of the West

      From Greenland to Ukraine, the Fracturing of the West

      Click on the image to listen to the recording on LinkedIn, in French

      Full transcript of my interview with France Info public radio on 18 January 2026.

      France Info: Hello, Rémi Bourgeot, thank you for joining us on France Info. In just 24 hours, do you think we have crossed all the thresholds that lead to a trade war, an economic war with the United States?

      Yes, in fact, we’ve been in this situation for quite some time. You’ll recall that last year, headlines were dominated by Donald Trump’s threats—threats of escalating tariffs—which ultimately led to a so-called « agreement » that was really just a series of demands accepted by the European Commission, including blanket tariffs of 15%, and, on top of that, Europe’s acceptance of very strict constraints, particularly to avoid over-regulating or challenging Californian tech giants. So that’s where we’re coming from. Things had quieted down a bit in recent months.

      So, yes, the end of this agreement was extremely unfavorable to the European Union, not only because of the tariffs but also because of the constraints that came with it, and Europe simply accepted the American demands?

      Absolutely. This agreement was extremely unfavorable to the European Union, not just because of the tariffs but also because of the constraints that accompanied them. Europe simply accepted the American demands. There wasn’t really any negotiation on the part of Ursula von der Leyen, who was later criticized by several European countries. We thought that was the end of it, but in reality, we’re seeing a much broader deterioration in relations between Europe and the United States—a genuine explosion within the Western bloc.

      This is particularly tied to the issue of Ukraine. We can see that the trade measures are targeting countries within the so-called « coalition of the willing. » So this is a much broader escalation. It seems that Trump actually wants to blow up NATO. This is a very aggressive show of force, which today goes far beyond trade—now a secondary issue. We’re in a frankly absurd situation with this Greenland issue. If there were a genuine strategic interest—and perhaps there is for the United States—they could achieve the same benefits through cooperation with Denmark, a country that is extremely close to the United States. Here, we’re seeing broader patterns in Donald Trump’s approach. It’s a much deeper, more long-term deterioration.

      The fracturing of the Western block—isn’t that exactly what Donald Trump wants? How can we respond? By activating the anti-coercion mechanism, for one. Emmanuel Macron and his team have indicated that he will call for this instrument to be activated among his European partners. Concretely, Rémi Bourgeot, this is being called an economic « bazooka. » What would it actually look like if this mechanism were triggered?

      Well, first of all, we should have threatened and entered into this showdown with Donald Trump from the very beginning, during the negotiations this summer, to avoid being crushed. We needed to understand that this was just the beginning. Today, we’re facing a much broader and more serious aggravation, so we can’t just defend ourselves on the trade front. We have to respond. These measures are part of a fairly broad framework. People talk about a « bazooka, » but it was originally designed to be used against other countries, particularly China. It requires a very large majority in Europe to implement, so it’s not a done deal. But at the very least, we must consider a response. Trump’s counter-response will be escalation, with the threat of economically crushing the Europeans, because his logic is one of humiliation. He has no respect for European leaders, and there are deep disagreements on burning geopolitical issues like Ukraine.

      Rémi Bourgeot, you’re describing a catastrophic scenario. How can Europe resist such escalation?

      The catastrophic scenario is war, which is unthinkable between Europe and the United States. But what we’re going to see now is escalation. This current escalation, with threats of additional 10% tariffs on the countries involved, was triggered because Europe sent a few soldiers—almost symbolically—to Greenland. On the surface, it’s almost nothing, but Trump tolerates no opposition, even to demands as extraordinary and absurd as acquiring Greenland. The relationship is in a dynamic of fracture. We’re going to see all kinds of escalations. But Trump does tend to back down when faced with firm resistance. China, for example, threatened further escalation and deployed its own « bazooka »—restricting the export of rare earth minerals—which created massive industrial problems for the United States. India, threatened with secondary sanctions to limit its trade with Russia, also reacted strongly. So Trump is sensitive to pushback.

      We need to understand this context of deteriorating relations with Europeans over the central issue of Ukraine, which is at the heart of this escalation.

      Thank you very much, Rémi Bourgeot, for your analysis as an economist and associate researcher at IRIS. This trade war has existed in reality since Trump’s return, but it seems to be taking a more concrete form in the last 24 hours, with these new tariffs announced by the American president and Europe’s announcement that it intends to retaliate.